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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j). Pursuant to its authority under Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Court of
Appeals on October 15, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues presented on appeal:
1. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to consider Appellant's appeal?
Standard of review: "Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law."
Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 85, lj 6, 69 P.3d 286 (further quotation and citation
omitted). "[L]ack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either party or by the court."
Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. DisL, 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986).
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees
Jonathan Lowry and Nathan Kinsella, by determining that Appellees were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on Appellant's alter ego claims?
Standard of review: "Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment presents a
question of law, and [appellate courts] grant no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions and review them for correctness. Yet, '[a] trial court has broad discretion to
admit or exclude evidence and its determination typically will only be disturbed if it
constitutes an abuse of discretion.5" Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, Inc., 2008 UT
App 29,1| 7, _ P.3d _ (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, H 20, 989 P.2d 52) (further
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citations omitted). [R. 1149-1197, 1198-1200, 1201-1285,1584-1599, 1660-1683.]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed by Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. ("J&T

Marketing" or "Appellant") on August 29, 2002. [R. 49.] The complaint named Financial
Development Services, Inc. ("FDS"), Jeremy Warburton, and John Neubauer as
defendants and contained six causes of action. [R. 39-49.] All of J&T Marketing's claims
against these defendants arose out of or were related to a Sales and Marketing Agreement
("Agreement") entered into between FDS and J&T Marketing and made effective as of
January 31, 2002. [R. 33-37.] (A copy of the Agreement is included in the Addendum
hereto at Tab A.) Pursuant to the Agreement, J&T Marketing supplied FDS with the
names, addresses and phone numbers of sales leads, and FDS marketed and sold Ted
Thomas Courses through telemarketing and other sales efforts. [R. 1702.] After
conducting some discovery, J&T Marketing filed a motion for leave to amend its
complaint. [R. 301-02.] The trial court granted J&T Marketing's motion in part,
permitting J&T Marketing to file an amended complaint that for the first time named
Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella (collectively "Appellees") individually as
defendants.1 [R. 994-996.] J&T Marketing filed its Amended Complaint on June 18,

1

The trial court denied J&T Marketing's Motion to Amend as it pertained to two new
causes of action alleging civil liability for violations of Utah's Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act and the federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act. [R. 995.]
J&T Marketing subsequently filed a Modified Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint seeking to add an additional cause of action alleging conspiracy, [R. 886-87],
but the trial court denied this motion in its entirety, [R. 1015-17].
4817-3352-9346:LO001.003
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2004, alleging nine cause of action, including breach of contract, theft by conversion,
fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, accounting,
injunctive

relief, constructive

fraud,

fraudulent

non-disclosure, and intentional

interference with business relations. [R. 1027-44.]
II.

Proceedings Below
Appellees Lowry and Kinsella filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, requesting

summary judgment on J&T Marketing's second, third, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes.
of action as they applied to Lowry and Kinsella.2 [R. 1198-1200.] Opposing Appellees'
motion, J&T Marketing relied heavily upon statements made by John Neubauer in a
deposition taken in Mr. Neubauer's separate bankruptcy proceeding. [R. 1292-1322.]
Appellees Lowry and Kinsella objected to J&T Marketing's submission of Mr.
Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition and moved to have it stricken from the record. [R.
1570-1571.] At the hearing held to consider Lowry and Kinsella's motions, the trial court
granted Appellees' motion to strike the deposition3 but granted J&T Marketing additional

J&T Marketing's First, Fourth, and Fifth causes of action were brought only against
FDS. [R. 1034-35, 1031-32.] J&T Marketing's Sixth cause of action dealt with injunctive
relief. [R. 1030-31.]
3

Lowry and Kinsella moved to strike Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition because
they did not have notice of or attend the deposition, as required by Rule 32(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because the portions relied on by J&T Marketing lacked
foundation, were irrelevant, or were speculative and misleading. [R. 1577-83.] The trial
court granted this motion on September 22, 2005. [R. 1629.] It was within the discretion
of the trial court to exclude the bankruptcy proceeding testimony while granting J&T
Marketing additional time to take Mr. Neubauer's deposition in this case. See Whittle,
1999 UT 96 at H 20. J&T Marketing has not appealed the trial court's decision to strike
Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition, and it cannot now support any factual allegations
by relying on that stricken deposition testimony.
4817-3352-9346:LO001.003
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time to conduct a new deposition of Mr. Neubauer. [R. 1629.] The trial court ordered that
after participating in this new deposition, supplemental briefs could be filed by each
party. [R. 1629, 1635-37.]
J&T Marketing took the deposition of Mr. Neubauer on October 18, 2005, and
supplemental briefs were filed by both parties whereupon the trial court granted
Appellees' motion in part. [R. 1691-1703] In its Ruling Granting In Part Defendants
Lowry and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on February 1, 2006 (a
copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab B), the trial court granted
summary judgment to Appellees Lowry and Kinsella on the second, seventh, eighth, and
ninth causes of action of the Amended Complaint. [R. 1691-97.] With respect to J&T
Marketing's

third

cause

of

action

(J&T

Marketing's

claim

for

fraudulent

misrepresentation) however, the trial court granted only partial summary judgment,
explaining in regards to one written statement allegedly made by Lowry that "[d]rawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court denies Defendant Lowry's
motion for summary judgment as to this claim." [R. 1692 (emphasis added).] This ruling
denying summary judgment on this claim is set forth in the trial court's Order on
Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on March 21,
2006 ("Order") (a copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab C). [R.
2021.] In making its determinations, the trial court noted that "Neubauer's bankruptcy
deposition has been stricken in its entirety, and is only reliable inasmuch as it is
corroborated by the October 18, 2005 deposition." [R. 1695.]
Following the entry of the Order on March 21, 2006, confirming the trial court's
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February 1, 2006 ruling, J&T Marketing took no further action to pursue the remaining
active claim upon which the trial court refused to grant summary judgment. After entry of
this Order, which left an active unresolved claim, the trial court was never asked to
certify and in fact never certified the March 21, 2006 Order as final for purposes of
appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). J&T Marketing, however, did obtain a default judgment
against Defendants FDS and Exbex.com on September 13, 2007, resolving its claims
against those two defendants. [R. 2215-17.] The September 13, 2007 default judgment
did not in any way address J&T Marketing's outstanding claim against Appellee Lowry
for fraudulent misrepresentation as alleged in the third cause of action of the Amended
Complaint and on which the trial court had expressly refused to grant summary judgment
in the ruling of February 1, 2006.
III.

Statement of Undisputed Facts4
J&T Marketing's claims arise out of a contractual dispute between FDS and J&T

4

J&T Marketing's citations to the record in its Statement of Facts of the Brief of
Appellant do not appear to correspond to pages in the record that actually support the
stated facts. Indeed, some of the citations actually refer to J&T Marketing's argument
section of its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowiy and Nathan
Kinsellays Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 1293-1308.] J&T Marketing's
Memorandum relies heavily upon the bankruptcy deposition of John Neubauer, which the
trial court specifically struck from the record in its entirety. [R. 1695.] J&T Marketing's
Statement of Facts also apparently cites to the new Declaration of John Neubauer (dated
October 15, 2005), attached to its Supplemental Memorandum. [R. 1640-49.] However,
these citations also do not correspond to evidence that would create disputed material
facts regarding Lowry and Kinsella's liability. In addition to this citation problem, Lowry
and Kinsella note that Mr. Neubauer's new deposition testimony demonstrates serious
foundational flaws. Mr. Neubauer stated several times that he can no longer recollect
much concerning the day-to-day business of FDS or Esbex.com. [R. 1641, 1645;
Neubauer Dep. at 12:10-23; 23:10-14; 39:1-9; 40:11-14.] Thus, J&T Marketing's
citations to the record fail to support the facts contained in its Statement of Facts.
4817-3352-9346:LO001.003
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Marketing over the performance of a contract solely between J&T Marketing and FDS.
[R. 33-37, 1320.] FDS and J&T Marketing entered into this contractual relationship at or
near the beginning of February 2002. [R. 33, 37, 1320.] Pursuant to the contract, J&T
Marketing supplied FDS with the names, addresses and phone numbers of sales leads,
and FDS marketed and sold through telemarketing and other sales efforts the "Ted
Thomas Courses" supplied by J&T Marketing. [R. 1320.] Approximately five and a half
months after entering into the contract, i.e., on July 19, 2002, FDS informed J&T
Marketing that J&T Marketing was in breach of contract inasmuch as it had failed to
supply the Ted Thomas Courses FDS was selling and gave notice of cancellation of the
agreement. [R. 1316, 1598.] In reaction to FDS's cancellation, J&T Marketing filed suit
against FDS and others on August 29, 2002. [R. 1316.] The initial complaint did not
name Lowry or Kinsella as defendants. [R. 49.] However, when the trial court permitted
J&T Marketing to amend its complaint, the Amended Complaint increased the causes of
action alleged from six to nine, with five of the causes of action seeking to hold Lowry
and Kinsella personally liable for their alleged activities arising out of or related to the
contract between FDS and J&T Marketing. [R. 1315-16.]
It is undisputed that J&T Marketing delayed or halted some shipments of its Ted
Thomas Courses to FDS for a number of reasons including the following: J&T Marketing
would delay shipment of the product if payment was delayed; J&T Marketing employed
temporary shipping clerks to do product shipment, which resulted in staff turnover and
ongoing training and supervision issues; and J&T Marketing finally ceased shipping Ted
Thomas Courses altogether due to a contract dispute with FDS over payment issues. [R.
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1317.] A third-entity, Esbex.com, while not providing Ted Thomas Courses per se,
provided coaching/mentoring services for a monthly fee to purchasers of the Ted Thomas
Courses. [R. 1319.] Payment issues included the question of whether fees were due on
such coaching services. When J&T Marketing failed to ship product to FDS, FDS filled
some orders by shipping products that had been returned by other clients because it "was
trying to fulfill to make people happy and prevent a refund or cancellation." [R. 1647;
Deposition of John Neubauer (dated October 18, 2005) ("Neubauer Dep.") 16:4-14.] In ,
addition, although J&T Marketing asserts that FDS and Esbex.com should have split
coaching fees under the contract, the only evidence is that FDS believed that the coaching
fees were not covered by the contract and were not to be shared with J&T Marketing. [R.
1644; Neubauer Dep. 26:10 to 28:12.]
Lowry and Kinsella were shareholders, officers and directors of FDS and
Esbex.com. [R. 1318, 1916.] John Neubauer was the Chief Operating Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of FDS, and both FDS and Esbex.com used Mr. Neubauer to perform
their accounting. [R. 1598, 1917.] Mr. Neubauer was FDS's principal agent in dealing
with J&T Marketing, and all communication with J&T marketing went through Mr.
Neubauer. [R. 1318-19, 1916-17.] In his deposition taken in this case on October 18,
2005, Mr. Neubauer testified that FDS and Esbex.com were legitimate companies, stating
that he "wouldn't have worked there if [he] didn't feel that way." [R. 1640, Neubauer
Dep. 42:4-11.] Mr. Neubauer also testified that while Lowry and Kinsella took money
from the business, he does not remember exactly how the money was accounted for, but
he did specifically recall that he accounted for such withdrawals as instructed. [R. 1641,
4817-3352-9346:LO001.003
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Neubauer Dep. 40:3-14.] The only evidence in the record is to the effect that FDS and
Esbex.com followed corporate formalities. [R. 1196.] There is no evidence that Appellees
Lowry or Kinsella co-mingled funds or acted outside of the scope of their corporate
responsibilities at any time relevant to this matter.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
J&T Marketing specifically appeals an order entered by the trial court on March
21, 2006, partially granting Lowry and Kinsella's motion for summary judgment. This
order was not final, having been granted only in part, and leaves at issue a portion of one
of J&T Marketing's causes of action against Lowry. Given the fact that there is an
unadjudicated issue still pending before the trial court, this Court does not have
jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, this Court only has the authority to dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
If, however, this Court determines that it can exercise jurisdiction over J&T
Marketing's appeal, then it should uphold the trial court's decision to grant Lowry and
Kinsella's motion for summary judgment. On a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party has an obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to show that the
non-moving party is entitled to proceed to trial." In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004
UT 3, K 41, 86 P.3d 712. In the matter before this Court, J&T Marketing failed to present
evidence establishing any genuine issues of material fact existed regarding J&T
Marketing's alter ego theory claims. The alter ego theory only arises if two factors are
shown: (1) that there is a unity of interest or ownership between the individual and the
corporation, and (2) that maintaining the corporate form would sanction fraud, promote
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injustice or create an inequitable result. See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.,
2003 UT 57, U 36, 84P.3d 1154. J&T Marketing failed to present evidence establishing
genuine issues of material fact regarding either of these two prongs. In addition, J&T
Marketing failed to present genuine issues of fact on every element of its claims for
personal liability against Lowry and Kinsella. On the other hand, the undisputed evidence
demonstrates that neither Lowry nor Kinsella should be held personally liable for any of
J&T Marketing's alleged injuries arising out of its contractual agreement with FDS.
Considering the submissions before it, the trial court correctly ruled that there were no
material issues of fact on the issue of summary judgment and correctly granted Lowry
and Kinsella summary judgment as a matter of law.
Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial court's decision to grant summary
judgment to Lowry and Kinsella or dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
HEAR J&T MARKETING'S APPEAL
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides a procedure for the trial

court to certify as final a judgment that addresses "fewer than all of the claims or parties."
A judgment that "adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties" and that is not certified as final by the trial court does "not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties," Utah R. Civ. Pro. 54(b), and is not
final for purposes of appeal. "A trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment
which does not dispose of all claims of all parties, and which has not been certified as a
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final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is not a final
judgment for purposes of appellate jurisdiction." Sneddon v. Graham, 821 P.2d 1185,
1189(UtahCt.App. 1991).
A. The Trial Court's Order on Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella Js Motion for
Summary Judgment is not Final for Purposes of Appeal
Appellate courts "[d]o not have jurisdiction over an appeal unless it is taken from
a final judgment, or qualifies for an exception to the final judgment rule." Loffredo v.
Holt, 2001 UT 97, Tj 10? 37 P.3d 1070. J&T Marketing, in its Docketing Statement,
informed this Court that after reviewing the submissions on Appellees' Motion for
Summary Judgment "[t]he District Court then concluded that none of Appellant's claims
could be sustained against Lowry and Kinsella personally and granted Lowry and
Kinsella's motion for summary judgment." Docketing Statement at 3-4 (emphasis added).
(The Docketing Statement is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab D.) However, J&T
Marketing correctly noted in a footnote that summary judgment was granted "as to every
claim against Lowry and Kinsella personally, with the exception of the fraudulent
misrepresentation claim against Lowry T Id. at 4 n.l (emphasis added). Despite its
recognition that trial court's Order is not final, i.e., it did not finally adjudicate all claims,
J&T Marketing nevertheless asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal.
"[T]o be considered a final order, the trial court's decision must dispose of the
claims of all parties." Loffredo, 2001 UT 97 at ^J 12. "An order that does not wholly
dispose of a claim or a party is not final, and therefore not appealable." Sneddon, 821
P.2d at 1189 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). By noting in its Docketing Statement that the
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summary judgment order did not dispose of one of its claims, J&T Marketing admits that
the trial court's summary judgment order did not wholly dispose of its claims against
Lowry and Kinsella and the order was therefore not final for purpose of appeal. "Where
the final judgment rule is not satisfied, the proper remedy for this court is dismissal."
Loffredo9 2001JJT 91 dA^ll.
B. J&T Marketing's Appeal does Not Qualify for an Exception to the Final
Judgment Rule
Were J&T Marketing to assert that its appeal qualifies for an exception to the final
judgment rule, its argument would fail. This Court could assert jurisdiction over the trial
court's non-final order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment if the appeal
qualifies for one of three special exceptions to the final judgment rule. See id. at 1|15. A
non-final judgment may be appealed (1) "if the three requirements of rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied;" (2) if "a parties obtains [the appellate
court's] permission under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure;" or (3) "if an
appeal is permitted by statute." Id.
J&T Marketing did not comply with the procedures specified for certification
under rule 54(b) and none of the three requirements of Rule 54(b) has been satisfied5;
Even if Appellant had complied with Rule 54(b), the period for filing an appeal expired

5

"First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the action. Second,
the judgment appealed from must have been entered on an order that would be appealable
but for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the action. Third, the trial court, in
its discretion, must make a determination that "there is no just reason for delay" of the
appeal." Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984); see also Utah R.
Civ. Pro. 54(b). The trial court never made, nor was it ever asked to make, the required
findings to certify the Order as final.
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long before the appeal was filed since the order J&T Marketing has appealed from was
entered on March 21, 2006, and the Notice of Appeal was not filed until October 9, 2007,
nearly a year and a half later. Moreover, J&T Marketing's appeal fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 5. Rule 5 requires a petition for permission to appeal to be field
within twenty days "after the entry of the order of the trial court." Utah R. App. Pro. 5(a).
J&T Marketing has filed no such petition. Finally, J&T Marketing has pointed to no
applicable statute that would allow it to appeal the trial court's non-final Order entered on
March 21, 2006.
Though Lowry and Kinsella believe that the trial court correctly awarded
summary judgment in their favor and that their arguments on the merits of the appeal,
which follow, would result in an affirmance by this Court, they note that "acquiescence
of the parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction and that a lack of jurisdiction can be
raised at any time by either party or by the court." Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 724
P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986). As this Court is without jurisdiction to hear J&T Marketing's
appeal, it appears that the only remaining available action to this Court is dismissal.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF LOWRY AND KINSELLA
BECAUSE THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
A. Under the Applicable Standard of Review, the Trial Court Correctly
Granted Summary Judgment on J&T Marketing's Claims
Should this court determine that it has jurisdiction, Lowry and Kinsella assert that

this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on their summary judgment motion and
deny the appeal. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary
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judgment may be obtained "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). However, Utah courts have held that
[o]nce the allegations in a complaint are challenged, the non-moving party
has an obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to show that the
non-moving party is entitled to proceed to trial. It is not enough to rest on
allegations alone, particularly when the parties have had an opportunity for
discovery.
In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, % 41, 86 P.3d 712 (emphasis added).
J&T Marketing erroneously urges this Court to conduct a single inquiry into
whether there are disputes of material facts and cites to the 1995 case of Draper City v.
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995), for the proposition that it is not required
to prove all the elements of its claims against Lowry and Kinsella. The Utah Supreme
Court held in Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37, H 12, 977 P.2d 1205, Jensen v. IHC
Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997), and Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3 at H 41, that
while the moving party must show that there is no material issue of fact, "in opposing a
motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving all the
elements of his or her cause of action." Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37 at ^| 12 (quoting Jensen,
944 P.2d at 339); accord Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3 at T|41.
Appellees acknowledge that "a trial court should not weigh disputed evidence, and
its sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist." Estate of Bernardo, 888
P.2d at 1100. However, when contending against a motion for summary judgment, a
plaintiff "has the obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to show that [it is]
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entitled to proceed to trial." Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37 at ^J 12. Evidence is sufficient when
it raises "a genuine issue of fact." Klienert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). When the plaintiff as the non-moving party does not submit
evidence to support an element of its claim, the trial court should grant summary
judgment on that claim.
Utah court decisions on this standard are consistent with United States Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the federal equivalent of Utah's Rule 56.
When a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case . . . there can be 'no genuine
issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning
an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial." Thus, the standard for summary judgment "mirrors
the standard for a directed verdict," in that a moving party, who has
otherwise made its case, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where
the "nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of
proof."
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)
and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986))).
B. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on J&T
Marketing's Alter Ego Claims
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella on
J&T Marketing's alter ego theory because there were no genuine issues of material fact
making summary judgment appropriate as a matter of law. In Utah "a corporation is
regarded as a legal entity, separate and apart from its stockholders.'"' Dockstader v.
Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973); accord Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
4817-3352-9346 LO001 003
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Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "In so immunizing corporate
directors from personal liability, the law has proceeded on the theory that in so acting
they are but the agents of the corporation and that the breach is that of the corporation,
and hence it alone is answerable therefore [sic]." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577,
582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted). Utah Courts "have stated
that '[cjourts must balance piercing and insulating policies and [should] only reluctantly
and cautiously pierce the corporate veil."' Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d
42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)).
Two elements must exist for a court to pierce the corporate veil. "The corporate
form may be disregarded when there is 'such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist . . . and the
observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an
inequitable result would follow.'" Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57,
If 36, 84 P.3d 1154 (quoting Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028,
1030 (Utah 1979)). J&T Marketing claims that it presented "enough disputed facts" to
overcome Lowry and Kinsella's motion for summary judgment. Brief of Appellant at 12.
The evidence, or rather lack thereof, before the trial court suggests otherwise.
1. J&T Marketing Did Not Provide Evidence to Support the Unity of
Interest Prong of the Alter Ego Theory
J&T Marketing's claims boil down to a contract dispute between itself and FDS,
and all of J&T Marketing's allegations regarding fraud and misrepresentation rest solely
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on its unilateral interpretation of the contract terms. In Utah, factors have been identified
that guide a determination of whether the unity-of-interest prong has been violated. These
factors include the following:
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe
corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of
corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunctioning of other
officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or
stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice
or fraud.
Coltnan v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
As J&T Marketing noted in its brief, Utah courts have stated that u[f]ailure to
distinguish between corporate and personal property, the use of corporate funds to pay
personal expenses without proper accounting, and failure to maintain complete corporate
and financial records are looked upon with extreme disfavor." Colman, 743 P.2d at 786 n.
3. J&T Marketing has presented no evidence that Lowry or Kinsella commingled
corporate funds with their own. Instead, J&T Marketing points to the evidence that
Lowry and Kinsella took money from the corporation for their personal use. See Brief of
Appellee at 14.6 J&T Marketing suggests that the mere fact that Lowry and Kinsella were
distributed money out of the corporation, standing alone, raises questions of fact
concerning the unity of interest prong of the alter ego theory. See id. However, J&T
6

J&T Marketing's citations to the record here do not align with actual pages in the record
supporting its claims. To the extent J&T Marketing's citations refer to portions of its
original Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan
Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment that rely on the bankruptcy declaration of Mr.
Neubauer, the citations provide no support since the trial court struck Mr. Neubauer's
deposition in its entirety. [R. 1695.] J&T Marketing has not appealed the trial court's
decision on that issue.
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presented no evidence that these disbursements represented improper siphoning of the
corporation's funds or that the corporation's funds were co-mingled with those of these
shareholders. Mr. Neubauer testified that he, as the CFO of FDS and Esbex.com
accounted for the money withdrawn by Lowry and Kinsella as instructed. [R. 1641,
Neubauer Dep. 40:8-14.] It would be hard to find a successful corporation that did not
provide funds to its shareholders. In addition, Mr. Neubauer testified that Lowry and
Kinsella instructed him to "find a way to free up expenses and free up cash flow" to.
provide refund checks to customers. [R. 1644; Neubauer Dep. 25:7-23.]
Mr. Neubauer5s testimony as the CFO of FDS and Esbex.com was that he
prepared the financial records including monthly income statements and net profit and
loss statements, [R. 1642; Neubauer Dep. 36:18-25], and that from his perspective neither
FDS nor Esbex.com had fraudulent purposes, [R. 1640; Neubauer Dep. 42:9-10]. Mr.
Neubauer agreed that Lowry and Kinsella desired to make a profit but such was "true of
every business." [R. 1668; Neubauer Dep. 11:9-25.] No testimony showed that Lowry or
Kinsella, as owners of both FDS and Esbex.com, failed to comply with corporate
formalities. The fact that Lowry and Kinsella took money out of the corporation does not
show that corporate funds were treated as personal property, that proper accounting did
not occur, or that proper financial records were not kept. Indeed, the evidence as stated
above shows exactly the opposite. And J&T Marketing presented no evidence to dispute
that Lowry and Kinsella took steps they believed to be commercially reasonable in
managing and operating FDS and Esbex.com. [R. 1194-96.]
Since J&T Marketing failed to present a dispute of material fact concerning the
4817-3352-9346.-LO001.003
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unity of interest and ownership factor, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment
to Lowry and Kinsella on this prong alone.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Provide Evidence to Support the Fraud,
Injustice, or Inequitable Result Prong of the Alter Ego Theory
J&T Marketing argues in its brief that the trial court incorrectly failed to consider
the second prong of the alter ego theory. Brief of Appellant at 15. Once the trial court had
determined that J&T Marketing had not presented evidence to support its claim that the
unity of interest prong was met [R. 1694], however, the trial court had no need to
consider the second prong of the test. Nevertheless, Lowry and Kinsella submit that J&T
Marketing did not present evidence probative to the establishment of a genuine issue of
material fact as to the second prong of the alter ego theory.
To support its argument, J&T Marketing relies on a Utah case in which the court
found that the evidence of undercapitalization in that case showed that maintaining the
corporate shield would be unfair and unjust. See Brief of Appellant at 15 (citing Salt Lake
City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). In James
Constructors, the court noted that among other things the evidence showed that the
subsidiary's officers did not act independently from the parent, that the parent financed
the subsidiary and paid some of its debts, and that funds were advanced by the corporate
parent only "on an 'as needed' basis, without formal documentation and with no
particular requirements for repayment." Id. There was no parent-subsidiary relationship
in this case. There was no evidence presented that would tend to show either that Lowry
or Kinsella personally paid debts of FDS or Esbex.com or that these entities paid their
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personal debts. There is no evidence that financial transactions were made without formal
documentation. Instead, there is evidence that all financial transactions were documented
and accounted for by Mr. Neubauer. [R. 1641; Neubauer Dep. 40: 11-14.]
J&T Marketing additionally points to a divorce case in which upholding the
corporate form was determined to be unjust because "plaintiffs post-settlement
agreement business transactions would convert substantial assets, which otherwise would
be regarded as marital property, to corporate assets in which plaintiff had no interest."
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Colman, the wife
claimed that the husband was hiding marital assets behind corporate entities, which assets
would otherwise be subject to a written property settlement agreement. See id. at 783-84.
In this case, there is no evidence tending to show either that Lowry and Kinsella were
using the entities to hide personal assets or vice versa. Rather, J&T Marketing halted its
performance under the contract which rendered FDS and Esbex.com to be without the
supplies to meet its obligations. [R. 1317.] Without a legal basis, J&T Marketing is
improperly seeking restitution out of the personal finances of the corporate officers of
FDS and Esbex.com.
J&T Marketing asserts that FDS and Esbex.com were "clearly undercapitalized,"
relying solely on its contention that the entities had relatively short life-spans, that Lowry
and Kinsella took money out of the companies, and that the companies are now insolvent.
Brief of Appellant at 16. Insolvency does not make maintaining the corporate form unjust
or inequitable. Appellant submits no evidence that would tend to support its claim that
insolvency was actually caused by undercapitalization. Such a claim would at the very
4817-3352-9346:LO001.003
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least require a showing of how much capital was invested verses how much was needed.
Appellant presents no evidence on either point. The undisputed evidence is that FDS and
Esbex.com maintained their corporate formalities [R. 1196] and that Mr. Neubauer
accounted for all draws made by Lowry and Kinsella, [R. 1641; Neubauer Dep. 40: 1114].
J&T Marketing have not presented evidence creating disputes of material fact on
the second prong of the alter ego theory. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment on that issue to Lowry and Kinsella, and this Court should affirm.
C. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on J&T
Marketing's Causes of Action Against Lowry and Kinsella Since J&T
Marketing Did Not Present Material Evidence to Support These Claims
It is well settled in this State that if facts "would not establish a basis upon which
plaintiff could recover, no matter how they were resolved, it would be useless to consume
time, effort and expense in trying them, the saving of which is the very purpose of
summary judgment procedure." Abdulkadir v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 318 P.2d 339, 341
(Utah 1957). Despite conducting comprehensive discovery into all aspects of the
operations of FDS and Esbex.com, J&T Marketing failed to establish a factual basis upon
which it could recover against Lowry and Kinsella.7 The trial court, recognizing this
failure of evidence, properly granted summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella,
Allowing this matter to proceed would have been a useless, inefficient, and expensive
endeavor.

7

Noting, however, that the trial court did not grant summary judgment on a portion of
J&T Marketing's fraudulent misrepresentation claim.
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J&T Marketing asserts that the trial court incorrectly held that no personal liability
could attach to Lowry and Kinsella. Brief of Appellant at 16. The Utah Supreme Court
has held that a director or officer of a corporation may only be held "individually liable
for fraudulent acts or false representations of his own or in which he participates." Armed
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^J 19, 70 P.3d 35 (emphasis in original,
further citations omitted). The fact that a corporate officer's "duties generally include[]
overseeing the business activities of the corporation does not alone establish facts
supporting a claim that she is personally liable for fraud." Id. at ^| 20 (emphasis in
original). While an officer or director may be held individually liable for corporate torts
in which they personally participate, see d'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, ffl]
39, 43, 147 P.3d 515,8 J&T Marketing failed to provide evidentiary support for each
element of its claims. Thus, J&T Marketing's claims fail as a matter of law, and the trial
court properly granted summary judgment dismissing those claims.
1. Theft by Conversion
The trial court correctly granted Lowry and Kinsella summary judgment on J&T
Marketing's second cause of action for theft by conversion. Theft by conversion requires
the "willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the
person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d

8

J&T Marketing's argument that corporate officer may be held personally liable for
corporate torts in which they participate, which is distinct from piercing the corporate
veil, is a new argument brought for the first time on appeal. "With limited exceptions, the
practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time
on appeal." Centennial Inv. Co., LLC v. Nuttall, 2007 UT App 321, \ 27 n. 7, 171 P.3d
458.
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866, 870 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). J&T Marketing assert that Lowry and Kinsella
individually interfered with J&T Marketing's product, leads, client lists, and money. This
allegation arises out of J&T Marketing's interpretation of the contractual obligations of
FDS found in the Sales and Marketing Agreement. See Tab A.
J&T Marketing presented no evidence that Lowry or Kinsella converted J&T
Marketing's property to their own use. To the contrary, the only evidence presented to the
trial court was that neither Lowry nor Kinsella ever converted the property of J&T
Marketing to their own personal use. [R. 1193-94.] FDS did not report coaching fees
because those fees were not part of the contract with J&T Marketing. [R. 1644; Neubauer
Dep. 26:10 through 28:12.] Mr. Neubauer testified that FDS and Esbex.com did not have
fraudulent purposes in interpreting the contract and that he had no information
concerning fraudulent actions with respect to Kinsella or Lowry in connection with the
Ted Thomas account. [R. 1640; Neubauer Dep. 42:12-15.]
Without any evidence tending to prove that Lowry or Kinsella converted the
property of J&T Marketing, what alternative did the trial court have but to grant summary
judgment in favor of Appellees?
2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
J&T Marketing's third cause of action alleged fraudulent misrepresentation
against Lowry, Kinsella, Mr. Neubauer and FDS. As mentioned previously, the trial court
only granted partial summary judgment on this issue. See infra Part I.

9

Appellees here note that although trial court did not fully grant the motion for summary
judgment on this issue, they do not concede that J&T Marketing's remaining fraudulent
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J&T Marketing's claim on this cause of action rests on alleged failures to perform
promises found in the contract. [R. 1033-34.] These allegations cannot properly be
characterized as fraudulent misrepresentations at all, but are rather, on their face, simply
allegations of breach of contract. J&T Marketing rests these so-styled tort claims on the
supposed evidence supposedly provided by Mr. Neubauer that FDS withheld income
from coaching fees and made misrepresentations as to the volume of sales. Brief of
Appellant at 18. Appellant had opportunity to take Mr. Neubauer's deposition in this andsolicit information admissible in this case to support this claim. This Appellant failed to
do. Instead, Mr. Neubauer stated in his deposition taken in this case that FDS did not
believe that coaching fees fell under the Agreement with J&T Marketing. [R. 1644;
Neubauer Dep. 26:10 to 28:12.] Even if the excluded testimony were to be considered,
J&T Marketing presents no evidence10 to establish that Lowry or Kinsella individually or
personally made any misrepresentations.
In order to succeed on a claim for fraud in Utah, a plaintiff must prove the
following elements, by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) [t]hat a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a)
misrepresentation claim has any merit or that J&T Marketing can prevail on this issue at
trial.
10

Again, J&T Marketing's citations to the record here do not seem to align with actual
pages in the record supporting its claims. To the extent J&T Marketing's citations refer to
portions of its original Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and
Nathan Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment that rely on the bankruptcy declaration
of Mr. Neubauer, the citations fail to hold any weigh since the trial court struck Mr.
Neubauer's deposition in its entirety. [R. 1695.] J&T Marketing has not appealed the trial
court's decision on that issue.
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knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8)
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, TJ41. 56 P.3d 524. In this case, there
are no issues of material fact with respect to several of the above-identified elements.
Since J&T Marketing presented no material facts to support each element of its
fraudulent misrepresentation allegation, summary judgment was appropriate.
3. Constructive Fraud
The trial court properly concluded that constructive fraud could not be maintained
against Lowry or Kinsella as a matter of law. "A confidential relationship is a
prerequisite to proving constructive fraud." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769
(Utah 1985). "The doctrine of confidential relationships rests upon the principle of
inequality between the parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of
the parties over the other." Id. The only relationship here between the parties arose out of
the Agreement between J&T Marketing and FDS. Utah courts have held that the
"confidential relationship" required by Utah law to establish constructive fraud does not
include business dealings similar to the one here. See Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App
85, Yll 19-2069 P.3d 286, 290-91 (no confidential relationship between a buyer and seller
of property); State Bank ofS Utah v. Troy Hygro Sys.} Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Utah
Ct.App.1995) (finding confidential relationship claim failed as a matter of law between
bank and customer). Just as FDS was not in a position of confidence and trust superior to
that of the J&T Marketing, neither Lowry nor Kinsella could be held liable for
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constructive fraud. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on J&T
Marketing's constructive fraud claim as a matter of law.
4.

Fraudulent Non-Disclosure

The trial court properly granted summary judgment on J&T Marketing's cause of
action for fraudulent non-disclosure against Lowry and Kinsella. A party alleging
fraudulent non-disclosure must prove at least the following three elements: "(\) the
nondisclosed infonnation is material, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the
party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate." Hermansen v.
Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ^ 24, 48 P.3d 235. n In this matter, J&T Marketing never presented
evidence to support a legal basis for a duty to communicate such infonnation. [R. 129495.] Without a legal duty to communicate, Lowry and Kinsella could not be held liable
for fraudulent non-disclosure as a matter of law.
Since evidence establishing one of the essential elements of fraudulent nondisclosure was absent, J&T Marketing failed to establish a basis for recovering on this
claim, and summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law.
5.

Intentional Interference with Business Relations

Finally, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella
on J&T Marketing's ninth cause of action for intentional interference with business
relations. To succeed on a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, "a

11

There must also be proof that the fraud caused damages. Dilworth v. Lauritzen,\% Utah
2d 386, 390, 424 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1967) (trial judge justified in finding for defendant
on further ground that no competent evidence was given regarding the damages which
might have been sustained even if there had been fraud).
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plaintiff must demonstrate that c (l) . . . the defendant intentionally interfered with the
plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.'" Anderson Development Co. v.
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, \ 20, 116 P.3d 323. J&T Marketing merely alleges that Lowry and
Kinsella intentionally interfered with J&T Marketing's business leads. A poor attempt to
repackage the breach of contract claim and disregard the corporate form, this claim is not
supported by evidence. [R. 1293-94.] J&T Marketing has not shown a single instance
where Lowry or Kinsella personally and intentionally interfered with one of J&T
Marketing's current or prospective business relationships. Without evidence to support
the elements of this claim, J&T Marketing lacks a basis for recovering on this claim, and
this court should affirm the trial court's decision on this matter.
For all of the specific causes of action J&T Marketing alleged against Lowry and
Kinsella, the evidence presented to the trial court by J&T Marketing was at best "merely
colorable" and "not significantly probative." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S.
242, 249 (1986). As such its submissions were insufficient to demonstrate genuine issues
of material fact. See id. at 249-50 Thus, the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment because J&T Marketing failed to meet its burden of presenting evidence
establishing a reasonable inference that leads to Lowry and Kinsella's individual liability.
Therefore, Defendants Lowry and Kinsella respectfully request that this Court uphold the
decision of the trial court and deny J&T Marketing's Appeal.
CONCLUSION
Since this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider non-final orders on appeal,

4817-3352-9346:LO001.003

26

Lowry and Kinsella respectfully request that J&T Marketing's appeal be immediately
dismissed. Should this Court determine that it has jurisdiction, Lowry and Kinsella assert
that the evidence presented to the trial court was insufficient to demonstrate a genuine
issue of material fact. Accordingly, Appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
Appellees respectfully request that this Court affirm the trial court's order
granting summary judgment and deny J&T Marketing's appeal.
Dated this jl^day of February, 2008,

SMITH HARTVIGSEN,

PLLC

Earl Jay Peck
R. Christopher Preston
Attorneys for Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella
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SALES AND MARKETING AGREEMENT
This Sales and Marketing Agreement is made and is effective this 3 ( of January 2002, by and
between FDS ("Seller") and Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ("Jones").
RECITAL
Seller desires to perform certain sales and telemarketing seryices as on the terms and conditions
set forth to herein.
PROVISIONS
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:
1. Scope of the Agreement: Seller agrees as an independent contractor, to sell these products
designated for sale by Jones ("Jones' products") to those leads, supplied by Jones ("Jones' leads")
as further defined by the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
2, Seller's Services:
A. Seller will market and sell Jones products to Jones leads during the term of this
agreement.
B. Seller will work toward developing marketing strategies (and will inform Jones) for
distribution of Jones' products to Jones' leads; provided however, before implementing
any marketing strategies the strategies will be approved by Jones in writing.
C. Seller will get credit card approvals for sales of Jones' products using FDS' merchant
account.
D. Sales paid by check will be made payable to Jones and Trevor Marketing, Inc.
E. Seller can make available, if needed, a dedicated 800 number so that Jones can include
this number in its products,
F. Seller will use marketing scripts already being used and included as E>diibit A.
G. Seller will do its best to keep returns below 15% and generate at least $200 per lead
after cancels.
H. Seller will also be able to sell its own 4 week start-up coaching program for a one-time
fee of $995 plus charge a $99 ongoing monthly coaching service fee.
I. Seller will fax or email orders, for Jones' products, daily to Jones.
3, Services bv Jones:
A. Jones shall provide Seller leads, which will include the names, addresses, and phone
numbers, to allow Seller to perform its duties hereunder.
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B. Seller will submit a report of Seller's previous week's sales and the compensation and
reimbursement due Jones as defined in Section 5. Report shall be sent by Seller each
Friday for the sales made the two weeks prior. Report will include, hut not be limited to:
(i) A breakdown and total, by order, showing the monies due to Jones as defined
in Section 5, Compensation and Reimbursement.
(ii) A breakdown of each bad check, customer return and credit card chargeback.
These are defined as "Cancels" and the commissions previously retained by
Seller for these sales will be deducted on each weekly wire made by the Seller,
C. Jones shall provide Seller leads on each Friday.
D. Seller will process all credit card sales on Seller's merchant accounts.
4. Seller's Representations, Warranties, & Covenants:
A. Seller represents and warrants that it is not a party to any agreement, which would be
breached by execution, delivery, and performance of the terms of this Agreement to be
performed by the Seller.
B. Seller represents and warrants that it has all rights to any material used and furnished
by it in connection with performance of its service hereunder.
C. Seller acknowledges that as a result of its agreement hereunder, it shall be making use
of, acquiring or adding to confidential information of a special unique nature and value
relating to any Jones' trade secrets, systems, programs, procedures, manuals, confidential
reports, and communications and customer lists (including Jones' customer list)
("Confidential Information"), Seller further acknowledges that this information is a
valuable, special, and unique asset of Jones and that such information is and shall remain
the property of Jones. Additionally, Seller acknowledges that Jones may suffer
substantial harm if the Confidential Information or any confidential information is
disclosed including, without limitation, the list of Jones' leads. Therefore, Seller
covenants and agrees to hold the Confidential Information in confidence and neither to
use the Confidential Information for its own benefit or for the benefit of another, nor
disclose the Confidential Information, now or in the future, except for the use and
disclosure with the prior written consent of Jones or in the performance of Seller's duties
for Jones' benefit during the term of and under this Agreement. Additionally, Seller
covenants and agrees not to directly or indirectly by phone, mail, fax, email, website, or
otherwise solicit Jones' leads except in the performance of its duties for Jones' benefit
under and during the term of this Agreement. The covenants set forth in this paragraph
shall survive termination of the Seller's engagement under this Agreement indefinitely.
D. Seller covenants and agrees that it shall not, directly or indirectly, as an employee,
shareholder, partner, independent contractor or otherwise, for any reason whatsoever,
during the terra of this Agreement and for a period of three (3) years following
termination of this Agreement, for any reason, solicit, recruit, or in any manner attempt to
solicit or recruit a person that is an employee of Jones to leave such employment
relationship or induce such person to leave such relationship.
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E. Seller covenants and agrees that upon termination of this Agreement, it shall return all
Jones' materials provide by Jones (or an entity designated by Jones) to be sold by Seller
hereunder or to be used by the Seller to assist Seller's selling efforts hereunder including,
but not limited to, Jones' products, videos, audio reproductions, or testimonial letters.
F. Seller covenants and agrees that it shall perform its services diligently on behalf of
Jones and shall refrain from engaging in any activity which directly or indirectly could be
considered misleading, puffing, false, or deceptive,
G. Seller covenants and agrees that it shall either itself or through its attorneys review and
comply with the laws of the state in which it markets and sells Jones' products to Jones'
leads and the laws of the United States of America including, without limitation, Federal
Trade Commission Rules, Federal Trade Commission Deceptive Practices Laws, State
Home Solicitation Acts and State Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
5. Compensation and Reimbursement:
A. In consideration of Seller performing its services hereunder, Jones agrees to pay and
reimburse seller:
(i) A commission equal to 60% of all gross sales made by Seller not including
shipping charges by Jones. Out of that 60%, Seller will place 10% of all gross sales
into a reserve fund for any Cancels that may occur. Any Cancels, defined as all
returns, bad checks, and credit card chargebacks, will be paid from that reserve fund
and reported in a weekly reconciliation report. At the end of six months, a financial
reconciliation of that reserve will be completed and provided to Janes.
(ii) Commissions are to be sent via bank wire each Friday for the previous week.
6. Holdback:
A. Seller will hold back 2.5% (two and one half percent) of the sales due to Jones each
week until Seller has on reserve of Jones S 100,000. These funds will be used as a reserve
against bad checks, credit card returns and chargebacks for sales that were made prior to
the termination of this agreement. Jones' sales portion of all bad checks, credit card
returns and chargebacks that occur after the termination of this agreement will be
deducted from this reserve.
B. Since the credit card chargebacks process may occur up to 6 months after the date of
the sale and take another 6 months in the paperwork process (total of 12 months) the
remaining reserve will be returned as follows:
(i) $10,000 per month beginning 3 months after the termination of this
agreement,
7. Independent Contractor;
A. The parties acknowledge that the relationship established by this agreement is one of
independent contractor/contractor and not employee/employer. The parties are
responsible for paying their own respective employees, any taxes resulting from sales
made or commissions paid or earned pursuant to this Agreement, withholding takes,

0035

RUG 2 2 2 0 0 2

9:09RM

l

°

LRSERJET

3200

p.6

unemployment taxes, state, federal and local taxes and the like. Neither party may hoLd
itself out as a representative of the other party except as specifically set forth in this
Agreement.
8. Indemnification:
A. Seller agrees to defend, hold harmless and indemnify Jones from any and all
liabilities, expenses, actions, suits, proceedings, damages or judgments including, but not
limited to, reasonable attorneys5 fees, arising from any act or commission of seller in the
performance of services hereunder or selling Jones' products or as a result of a breach of
any term, condition, representation, warranty, or covenant contained in this Agreement
by Seller.
B. Jones' shall defend, hold harmless indemnify Seller from any and all liabilities,
expenses, actions, suits, claims' proceedings, damages or judgments including, but not
limited to, reasonable attorneys* fees, arising from any act or commission of seller in the
performance of services hereunder or selling Jones' products or as a result of a breach of
any term, condition, representation, warranty or covenant contained in this Agreement by
Jones.
9. Term:
A. The term of this Agreement shall be for twelve (12) months. This Agreement shall
automatically renew for twelve (12) months if its termination is not canfirmed in writing
anytime prior to the end of the current term. This Agreement may be terminated prior to
the end of the term as follows:
(i) Seller may terminate this Agreement upon breach by Jones of any term or
condition to be performed by Jones in this Agreement which is not cured by
Jones within ten (10) days of the written notice from Seller.
(ii) Jones may terminate this Agreement at anytime upon 45 days notice to Seller.
Upon Termination any funds held back by Seller under Paragraph 6A will be
returned to seller in a manner consistent with 6B(I).
10. Obligations an Termination:
A. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall immediately cease:
(i) Any contact with Jones' leads;
(ii) Selling Jones' products;
(iii) In any way representing to any party that it is a seller of Jones products; and
(iv) The use of Jones' trademarks service marks or other Confidential
Information.
B. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall provide Jones a final accounting of
compensation and reimbursement due Jones and forward funds within 10 business days
by bank wire transfer.
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C. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall return to Jones all Jones'
Confidential Information, including Jones' customer leads or lists, and all Jones'
products, within forty eight (48) hours of termination by overnight deLivery service.
11. Miscellaneous:
A. This Agreement:
(i) Shall constitute the entire agreement between the parties hereto and
supersedes all prior agreements, written or oral, concerning the subject matter
herein and there are no oral understandings, statements or stipulations bearing
upon the effect of this Agreement which have not been incorporates herein.
(ii) May be modified or amended only by a written instrument signed by each of
the parties hereto,
(iii) Shall bind and insure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective
heirs, Successors and assigns.
B. All notices hereunder shall be in writing and shall be deemed to hare been delivered
on the day of mailing if sent by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid and return
receipt requested to the addresses set forth at the beginning of this Agreement or such
other address known by party sending notice hereunder,
C. Any litigation involving this Agreement shall be adjudicated in a court with
jurisdiction located in Utah County, Orem, Utah and the parties irrevocably consent to
the personal jurisdiction and venue of such court.
D. If any provision of this Agreement shall be held invalid or unenforceable by
competent authority, such provision shall be constructed so as to be limited or reduced to
be enforceable to the maximum extent compatible with the law as it shall then appear.
The total invalidity or enforceability of any particular provision of this Agreement shall
not affect the other provisions hereof and this Agreement shall be consumed in all
respects as if such invalid or unenforceable provision were omitted.
E. In the event of litigation to enforce the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the
losing party agrees to pay the prevailing party's cost and expenses incurred including,
without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement on the fir&t date above
written.
Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc.

FDS

Its:

Its: f£:ft'JU.t

Date

^ L - ^

Dats: F<L£ f & \
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING GRANTING IN PART
DEFENDANTS LOWRY'S AND
KINSELLA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC.
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 050100038

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES,
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN
NEUBAUER, JONATHAN L. LOWRY,
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX, LLC,

Judge Derek P. Pullan

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Jonathan L. Lowry's and Nathan Kinsella's
("Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on May 21, 2005. Plaintiff Jones & Trevor
Marketing ('"Plaintiff or "J &T Marketing") filed a Memorandum in Opposition on June 24, 2005. On
July 21, 2005, Defendants' filed their Memorandum in Reply in conjunction with a motion to strike the
bankruptcy deposition of John Neubauer. Plaintiff opposed the motion to strike on August 1, 2005. The
Court heard oral argument on both motions on September 22, 2005. The Plaintiff was represented by
Mr. Stephen Quesenberry, the Defendants were represented by Mr. Benjamin T. Wilson.
At the hearing, the Court granted Defendants' motion to strike, but allowed J&T Marketing the
opportunity to depose Mr. Neubauer again, this time in the presence of Defendants' counsel. On
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November 22, 2005, subsequent to the taking of Mi Neubauer's deposition, Plaintiff filed a
Supplemental Memoiandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion foi Summary Judgment On
Decembei 12, 2005, Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their motion for
summary judgment Both parties filed notices to submit for decision, and neither request asked the
Court to hear oral argument again on the matter
UNDISPUTED FACTS
After careful review of the pleadings, the Court finds the following facts are not in dispute
1

Plaintiff J&T Marketing is a Nevada corporation that sells training courses developed by its
owner and principal, Ted Thomas These courses offer information to those who purchase them
about how to buy tax lien certificates and engage m other similar activities to make money
(Amd Cpl ffill,10)

2

Defendant FDS was a Utah corporation fiom June 22, 1998 until November 3, 2004 when it was
dissolved (Amd Cpl U 2, Dept of Commerce Record) During its existence, FDS was engaged
m sales and telemarketing activities (Amd Cpl 1f 11, Lowry Aff 1f 2)

3.

In late 2001 or eaily 2002, an employee of FDS, Steve Bullpit, contacted Ted Thomas (President
of J&T Marketing) on behalf of FDS to explore the potential for a business relationship
(Thomas Depo p 20-22)

4

On January 31, 2002, J&T Marketing entered into a "Sales and Marketing Agreement" with FDS
wheieby J&T Marketing supplied FDS with the names addiesses and phone numbers of sales
leads and FDS marketed and sold Ted Thomas courses through telemarketing and other sales
efforts (Amd Cpl f 12, 28, Sales and Marketing Agreement, Lowry Aff 1f 12)

2
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The Contract provided, among other things that FDS could enroll purchasers of Ted Thomas
courses in a program to provide coaching services for $99 per month. (Amd. Cpl. % 13; Sales
and Marketing Agreement).
The Agreement allowed FDS to sell its coaching program and charge monthly on-going service
fees. (Thomas Aff. f 2H). The Agreement also required Jones to pay FDS a "commission equal
to 60% of all gross sales made by Seller." (Id at \ 5(a)(i)).
Defendant Esbex.com was created in September 2000 by Defendants Lowry and Kinsella as a
product fulfillment company to fulfill product and service orders received through the sales and
telemarketing efforts of FDS and other telemarketing companies (Kinsella I Depo. 11:19-25;
Neubauer Depo. p. 43)
Esbex.com was a DBA of FDS until June 2002, when it became Esbex.com , Inc., a Utah
corporation. (Amd. Cpl. U 7; Dept. of Chamber of Commerce Record). Esbex.com provided
coaching/mentoring services to purchasers of the Ted Thomas courses. (Amd. Cpl. 1ffl 11, ^ ) .
Esbex.com was dissolved on November 29, 2004. (Dept. Of Commerce Record).
Defendant John Neubauer is a former employee and the Chief Financial Officer and Chief
Operating Officer of FDS. From the time Mr. Neubauer took over responsibility for the finances
of FDS in February 2002 until he left a year later, FDS struggled and found it difficult to make
payroll for its approximately 40 employees. (Neubauer Depo. p. 16-17, 40-41; Lowry Depo.
9:19-21).
Neubauer was FDS's principal agent in dealing with J&T Marketing. All communications with
J&T Marketing came through Neubauer. He was FDS's point person and ran the business on a
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day-to-day basis. (Neubauer 16:19-21; Lukas Depo p. 17). Neubauer left FDS in early 2003.
(Kinsella I Depo. 18:1-2; Lowry Depo. 29:11-13).
10.

Defendant Jeremy Warburton was a former employee of FDS and manager of FDS's
telemarketing department. In that position, Mr. Warburton helped coordinate FDS's sales and
marketing efforts. (Amd. Cpl. ^ 3 , 17; Lowry Aff. H 7).

11.

Defendants Lowry and Kinsella were the only two shareholders, officers, and directors of FDS
and Esbex.com, until those companies dissolved in 2004. (Amd. Cpl.fflf5-6; Kinsella I Depo.
8:10-15, 11:19-25; Lowry Depo. pp. 17-18).

12.

Esbex.com provided product fulfillment services for not only FDS, but also for other companies.
(Delia Kinsella Depo. II 9:11, 15-20).

13.

FDS experienced trouble using its Visa and MasterCard merchant accounts to clear money on
purchases. Because the credit card purchases were expensive and transacted over the phone, they
resulted in a large number of refunds and charge backs and, occasionally, frozen merchant
accounts. (Neubauer Depo. 18: 10-22).

14.

FDS's problems with its merchant accounts culminated when a major merchant account
containing credit card charges for Plaintiffs Ted Thomas courses was frozen. (Neubauer 35:1125, 39:22-25, 40:1-24; Lowry Aff. <h 13).

15.

Plaintiff J&T Marketing delayed or halted some shipments of its Ted Thomas courses for a
number of reasons, including: J&T Marketing would delay shipment of the product if payment
was delayed (Lukas Depo. 26:25-27:1. 63:10-22), J&T Marketing employed temporary shipping
clerks to assist with product shipment, which resulted in staff turnover and ongoing training and

supervision issues. (Lukas Depo. pp. 65-73; Neubauer Depo. p. 34)
16.

J&T Marketing also ceased shipping its Ted Thomas courses due to the dispute over payment.
(Lowry Aff. f 13). Failure to receive the courses they had purchased with their credit cards
resulted in dissatisfied customers, and charge backs on FDS's credit card merchant accounts.
(Neubauer 25:10-18, pp. 33-34, 93:11-17; Lowry Depo. p. 39-40).

17.

J&T Marketing withheld delivery on orders because FDS had not timely paid J&T Marketing.
FDS withheld payment to J&T Marketing because a percentage of its sales would not go through
resulting in charge backs. (Lowry Depo. 49:6-23; Thomas 263: 13-17).

18.

On or about July 19, 2002, FDS communicated to J&T Marketing that FDS believed that J&T
Marketing was in breach of the Sales and Marketing Agreement. (Lowry Aff. Tf 14). Lowry,
FDS's President, sent J&T Marketing the letter canceling the Agreement.

19.

On or about August 29, 2002, J&T Marketing filed suit against FDS and several of its officers
and employees (Amd. Cpl.) and on or about November 15, 2002 FDS filed a counterclaim.
(Answer, Counterclaim and Jury Demand 11/15/2002).

20.

J&T Marketing's Amended Complaint, dated June 17, 2004, alleges the following causes of
action:
a.

Breach of Contract against FDS for selling courses after the contract had been terminated.

b.

Theft by Conversion against Lowry, Kinsella, Neubauer and FDS by willfully interfering
with J&T Marketing's chattel.

c.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation against Lowry, Kinsella, Neubauer and FDS related to
FDS's performance of the contract.

d.

Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing against FDS

e.

Accounting against FDS.

f.

Injunctive Relief against Lowry, Kinselia, Warburton, FDS and Esbex.com to enjoin
them from future sales and marketing of the Ted Thomas courses.

g.

Constructive Fraud against Lowry, Kinselia, Warburton and FDS because they "shared a
confidential relationship based on their business activities" and "failed to disclose
material facts to J&T Marketing."

h.

Fraudulent Non-Disclosure against Lowry, Kinselia and FDS related to Defendants'
activities vis-a-vis Plaintiffs customers and clients,

i.

Intentional Interference with Business Relations against Lowry, Kinselia and FDS for
interfering with Plaintiffs existing and potential economic relations with clients and sales
leads.

On or about November 3, 2004, FDS and Esbex.com determined that they were insolvent and
dissolved. (Lowry Aff. ^ 18).
FDS and Esbex.com considered the coaching services to not be included under the Sales and
Marketing Agreement.
FDS received refunded Ted Thomas products, and turned around and shipped them out to its
customers. (Bankruptcy Depo 62:14-22; Oct. 18 Depo. 16:4-8).
The owners, Lowry and Kinselia took money out of the business. (Neubauer Bankruptcy Depo.
92:3-13).
Lowry and Kinselia determined the allocation of monies of FDS and Esbex. (Bank. Depo. 93:13-

14,94:9-12.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendants move for summary judgment on J&T Marketing's second cause of action for
conversion, third cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, seventh cause of action for fraud,
eighth cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure, and ninth cause of action for intentional
interference with business relations.
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court is to view all the
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 426 (Utah 1982). In opposing a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving elements of his or her cause of
action. "When a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element essential to the party's
case...there can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex
Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986).
The Alter Ego Doctrine and Piercing the Corporate Veil
A corporation is a legal entity separate and apart from its shareholders. Dockstader v. Walker,
510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973); see also, Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water. Inc.,
789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990). The limited liability afforded to shareholders permit them to make capital
contributions to business enterprises without placing personal assets at risk. David H. Barber, Piercing
the Corporate Veil 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 371-373 (1981); accord Salt Lake City Corp. v. James

Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 46 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The alter ego doctrine is an exception to this rule. Shareholders can be personally liable if there
is "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individual no longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few individuals."
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Additionally, the court must find that
observing the corporate form under such circumstances would "sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or
result in an inequity." Id.
Courts will "only reluctantly and cautiously pierce the corporate veil." Schafir v. Harrigan. 879
P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constr., Inc.. 761 P.2d 42,
26 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). "A key feature of the alter ego theory is that it is an equitable doctrine
requiring that each case be determined upon its peculiar facts." Salt Lake City Corp.. 761 P.2d 42, 26
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); (quoting National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp.. 341 F.2d 1022, 1023
(8th Cir. 1965)). The Court should examine the following factors to determine whether there is such
unity of interest that the corporate veil should be pierced:
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3)
nonpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5)
nonfunctioning of other officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) the
use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud.
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct App. 1987). Many of Plaintiff s causes of action
against Defendants rest on the alter ego doctrine.
Defendants argue that there is no evidence in the record that would allow Plaintiff to pierce the

corporate veil. Defendants were at all times acting in their corporate capacities and not personally.
Defendants also argue that many of Plaintiff s causes of action are really summed up in the breach of
contract claim, which would not implicate the Defendants personally. Limited liability to encourage
investment is the purpose of a corporation, and as noted, the corporate veil should be reluctantly pierced.
Plaintiff contends that there are material issues of fact in dispute as to whether FDS and
Esbex.com were merely the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff cites to the Neubauer depositions to
demonstrate that Kinsella and Lowry failed to observe corporate formalities, siphoned corporate funds
for personal use, and used the corporate entity to promote an injustice or fraud. Neubauer's bankruptcy
deposition has been stricken in its entirety, and is only reliable inasmuch as it is corroborated by the
October 18, 2005 deposition.
Plaintiffs citation to the Neubauer depositions does not create an issue as to a material fact as to
whether FDS and Esbex.com were the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff points to Neubauer's
statements regarding the decision to continue selling coaching, and to keep the money derived from
these sales. Neubauer testified that he understood proceeds from the coaching services to not be covered
under the Sales and Marketing Agreement, so that these funds were not supposed to be remitted to J&T
Marketing, whether it was before or after the cancellation of the Agreement (the timing of which is
unclear from the deposition). Plaintiffs claim is properly characterized as breach of contract based on
its interpretation of the contract, and does not implicate the Defendants personally.
Plaintiff cites to Neubauer's testimony that "FDS received refunded Ted Thomas products, and
turned around and shipped them out to its customers/' While Neubauer testified that he would consult
with one of the Defendants before sending out these products, the statement is that FDS performed these
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activities. There is no indication that the Defendants were acting outside the scope of their positions
within the corporations.
While Neubauer states that Kinsella and Lowry took money from the businesses, he does not
state that it was done improperly. In fact, Neubauer states that he doesn't remember how the money was
taken out by Kinsella and Lowry, whether by official paycheck or otherwise. (Neubauer Oct. Depo. 40:314). He also testified that he did not have information with regards to whether the Defendants acted
fraudulently with respect to J&T Marketing, and that he thought FDS and Esbex.com were legitimate
companies. (Neubauer Oct Depo. 42:4-15). Significantly, Plaintiff acknowledges that it was Neubauer
who ran the day-to-day operations of the businesses and handled communication with J&T Marketing.
Without evidence to show that the Defendants acted in their personal capacity or took funds
improperly, Plaintiff cannot sustain its allegation of alter ego.
Conversion
Theft by conversion requires the "willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." State v.
TwitchelL 832 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The Defendants argue that there is no evidence in the record that they converted the property of
J&T Marketing to their own use. FDS allegedly failed to remit 40% of sales to J&T Marketing, but even
accepting this fact as true, it does not show the Defendants converted J&T Marketing property to
Defendants' personal use. Failure to remit is a claim for breach of contract, not conversion.
Plaintiff contends that FDS and Esbex.com were merely the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff
contends that Kinsella and Lowry failed to observe corporate formalities, siphoned corporate funds for
10

personal use, and used the corporate entity to promote an injustice or fraud. The Court has already
decided that the alter ego doctrine does not apply to the acts of Defendants, and the corporate veil should
not be pierced. The Court grants Defendants motion for summary judgment as to the conversion claim.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
In order to prove fraud, the Plaintiff must show (1) that a representation was made, (2)
concerning a presently existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which the representor knew to be
false or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, (6) that the other party,
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it, (8) and was thereby induced
to act, (9) to his injury and damage. Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 536 (Utah 2002).
The Defendant argues that contractual promises are not statements of presently existing material
facts, unless a party makes those promises without any intent to perform.
The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants made fraudulent statements by inducing J&T Marketing
to enter into the contract with FDS without any intention to fully perform. Plaintiff contends that
Defendants misrepresented sales and refunds in weekly reconciliation reports and used Ted Thomas'
name after the Agreement had been canceled.
There is no evidence at the time of the contract the Defendants had a present intent not to
perform. Whether the Sales and Marketing Agreement entitled J&T Marketing to a percentage of the
sales from the coaching services is a question of contract interpretation. The Court has already found
that Plaintiff cannot pierce the corporate veil. Any misrepresentations as to weekly reconciliation reports
or regarding the volume and type of sales made, do not implicate the Defendants personally. There is
11
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also no evidence that either Defendant made statements of presently existing material facts that were
false.
One exception is Lowry's written statement that on termination of the contract "FDS would cease
selling Thomas's product and cease using Thomas's name and leads." There is evidence in the record
that FDS disregarded this representation completely. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
Plaintiff, the Court denies Defendant Lowry's motion for summary judgment as to this claim against
Lowry.
Constructive Fraud
Constructive fraud requires Plaintiff to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff
reposed trust in the Defendants based on an existing fiduciary relationship. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705
P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985).
Defendants argue that no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. Plaintiff contends
that FDS had confidential customer lists and that this is the basis for finding a confidential relationship.
As a matter of law, there was no confidential relationship between J&T Marketing and FDS
which extended to its officers and directors. Both businesses negotiated a commercial contract at arms
length. That contractual relationship did not grant to FDS the exclusive control over J&T Marketing's
interests that would give rise to a confidential relationship. See, Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 69 P.3d 286, 291
(Utah 2003). Nothing in the record demonstrates that the Defendants as officers and directors were
responsible for failures to disclose.
Fraudulent Non-disclosure
A party alleging fraudulent non-disclosure must prove the following three elements, (1) the

nondisclosed information was material, (2) the nondisclosed information is know to the party failing to
disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 241-242
(Utah 2002).
The Plaintiff cites no case law supporting its argument that the Defendants had a legal duty to
speak. Absent a relationship that would give rise to this duty, Defendants did not have a duty to
communicate to Plaintiff. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the Defendants
should be personally liable under this cause of action.
Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations
Defendant argues that this is merely a restatement of J&T Marketing's claims for breach of
contract and fraud. There is no evidence that Defendants interfered with one of Plaintiff s current or
prospective business relationships.
Plaintiff argues that it was FDS that interfered with J&T Marketing's business relationships, but
that the corporate veil should be pierced.
Without piercing the corporate veil, this cause of action cannot implicate the Defendants
personally.
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Earl Jay Peck (2562)
Steven H.Stewart (3114)
R. Christopher Preston (9195)
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC
215 S. State Street, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 413-1600
Facsimile (801) 413-1620
Attorneys for Defendants
Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella

MAR 2 1 2006
"T V 4TH WSTWCT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC.,
Plaintiff,
:

vs.
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES,
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN
NEUBAUER, JONATHAN L. LOWRY,
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX.COM,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS
LOWRY'S AND KINSELLA'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Case No. 050100038
Division 9 - American Fork
Judge: Derek P. Pullan

Defendants.

Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella ("Defendants") submitted a Motion
for Summary Judgment on May 20, 2005. Oral arguments were heard by the above-entitled
Court on September 22, 2005, before the Honorable Derek P. Pullan, Fourth District Court
Judge.

Defendants appeared and were represented by their attorney, Benjamin T. Wilson;

Plaintiff Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc., appeared and was represented by its attorney, Stephen
Quesenberry. On October 19, 2005, this Court issued its Order RE: Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment, permitting Plaintiff to take the deposition of John Neubauer and submit an
amended memorandum in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion. The deposition
of John Neubauer was held on October 18, 2005, and supplemental memoranda were submitted

4849-3834-0352 LO001 001
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by both parties. This Court having heard the arguments of counsel, having reviewed all the
memoranda of each party, being duly advised in the premises, with good cause appearing, issued
a Ruling Granting in Part Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment
filed on February 1, 2006 ("Ruling"), the entirety of which is hereby incorporated by reference.
Based upon the Undisputed Facts and the Conclusions of Law contained in the Ruling,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Second Cause of
Action (Theft by Conversion) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted.
2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action
(Fraudulent Misrepresentation) against Defendant Kinsella is granted.

Defendants'

motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action (Fraudulent
Misrepresentation) against Defendant Lowry is granted except as to Plaintiffs claim of
fraudulent misrepresentation based on Defendant Lowry's alleged written statement that
on termination of the contract "FDS would cease selling Thomas's product and cease
using Thomas's name and leads."
3. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of
Action (Constructive Fraud) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted.
4. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Eighth Cause of Action
(Fraudulent Non-Disclosure) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted.
5. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Ninth Cause of Action
(Intentional Interference with Business Relations) is granted.
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DATED this ^L

^

of March, 2006.
s \Y RED /.

BY THE COJURfc ; ^ > Q -

A
arable Derek P. Pullafr
fstrict'Court Judge
^

APPROVES AS TO FORM this _ J _ day of March, 2006.

StepheiiQuesehberry
J. Bryan Quesenberry
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 10 day of March, 2006. I served upon the following a true
and correct copy of the foregoing (proposed) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS LOWRY'S AND
KINSELLA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by causing the same to be
delivered by U S Mail, postage pre-paid, to the following
Stephen Quesenberry
J Bryan Quesenberry
Jamestown Square
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys foj Plaintiff
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APPELLATE CLEPKS OFFICE

ORIGINAL
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

OCT 2 6 2007
STEPHEN QUESENBERJRY (8073)
J. BRYAN QUESENBERRY (9156)
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.
RiverView Plaza, Suite 300
4844 North 300 West
Provo, Utah 84604-5663
Telephone (801) 375-6600
Fax (801) 375-3865
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC.,

DOCKETING STATEMENT

Plaintiff/Appellant,
Vfc.

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
SERVICES, INC., JEREMY
WARBURTON, JOHN NEUBAUER,
JONATHAN L. LOWRY, NATHAN
KINSELLA, and ESBEX.COM INC.,

Case No. 20070842

Defendants/Appellees.

District Court Case No. 050100038

1.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Fourth District Court of Utah.

2.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

section 78-2a-3(2)G) (2007).

01/25/08
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DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM
This appeal is from a final order and judgment of the Fourth District Court dated

September 14, 2007. A copy of this order and judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
Plaintiff specifically appeals the order entered by the trial court on March 21, 2006 partially
granting Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella's motion for summary judgment. A
copy of this order is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
4.

DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL
The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 9, 2007. A copy of the Notice is attached

hereto as Exhibit C
5.

DATE ANY POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS WERE FILED & THE DATE AND
EFFECT OF ANY ORDERS DISPOSING OF SUCH MOTIONS
There have been no post-judgment motions filed in this case. There have been no orders

disposing of post-judgment motions in this case.
6.

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the trial court err in partially granting Appellees Jonathan Lowry and Nathan

Kinsella's motion for summary judgment?
Standard of review: De novo. "Because, by definition, a district court does not resolve issues of
fact at summary judgment, we consider the record as a whole and review7 the district court's grant
of summary judgment de novo, reciting all facts and fair inferences drawn from the record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63, f7, 147 P.3d 439.
2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about June 17, 2004, Appellant filed an Amended Complaint, alleging theft by
conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, fraudulent nondisclosure,
and intentional interference with business relations against, among other entities and
individuals, Jonathan L. Lowry ("Lowry") and Nathan Kinsella ("Kinsella") personally.
2 Lowry and Kinsella were principals of Financial Development Services, Inc. ("FDS")
and Esbex.com, Inc. ("Esbex").
3. On or about May 20, 2005, Lowry and Kinsella filed a motion for summary judgment
on the ground that they bore no personal liability and were protected by the corporate
shield as principals of FDS and Exbex.
4. On or about June 23, 2005, Appellant filed an opposition to the motion for summary
judgment asserting, among other things, that issues of fact existed as to whether FDS
and/or Esbex were the alter egos of Lowry and Kinsella. The opposition also pointed out
other issues of fact, such as whether there was a confidential relationship between the
parties.
5. Eventually, the District Court found, as a matter of law, that FDS and Esbex were not
alter egos of Jonathan L, Lowry and Nathan Kinsella and refused to pierce the corporate
veil
6. The District Court then concluded that none of Appellant's claims could be sustained

3
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against Lowry and Kinsella personally and granted Lowry and Kinsella's motion for
summary j udgment
7. Appellant obtained a default judgment against Financial Development Services, Inc.
and Esbex.com, Inc. on September 14, 2007.
8.

RELATED APPEALS
There are no related appeals.

DATED this ffiday of October 2007.

HILL, J<pN#DN &SCHMUTZ, L.C.

iegfeentOuesenberryy
Bryan Quesenfe
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

1

The Court granted summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella as to every claim against Lowry and Kinsella
personally, with the exception of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim against Lowry.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ^ y d a y of October 2007 she caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following:
Earl Jay Peck
Steven H. Stewart
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC
215 South State Street, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Jonathan L. Lowry and
Nathan Kinsella

John C. Neubauer
7954 Cypress Pine Cove
Sandy, Utah 84070

Esbex.com Inc.
51 West Center Street, #403
Orem5 Utah 84057

Esbex.com Inc.
926 North 1430 West
Orem, Utah 84057

Financial Development Services, Inc.
51 West Center Street, #403
Orem, Utah 84057

Financial Development Services, Inc.
926 North 1430 West
Orem. Utah 84057

Sent Via:
\/

Hand -Delivery
Facsimile
Mailed (postage prepaid)
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